A solutions architect is designing a security architecture for a nuclear power plant facility. Which of the following would be the best design?

In the context of designing a security architecture for a nuclear power plant facility, implementing an air gap is the best choice. An air gap refers to a security measure that involves physically isolating a network or system from unsecured networks, such as the internet. This method is particularly effective in environments where sensitive or critical operations must be safeguarded from external threats.

For a nuclear power plant, the potential risks associated with cyber attacks could have severe consequences, including safety hazards and disruptive operational impacts. By employing an air gap, the facility ensures that its critical systems are not directly exposed to outside threats, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood of unauthorized access and cyber intrusions. This isolation helps protect vital operational technology, control systems, and sensitive data from being targeted or compromised.

On the other hand, while a jump box provides controlled access to secure environments, it does not ensure complete isolation from external networks. Guest environments generally do not serve critical operational purposes and can introduce vulnerabilities. Peer-to-peer architectures could facilitate unauthorized data exchange and increase exposure to security threats, making them unsuitable for the high-stakes environment of a nuclear facility. The air gap, therefore, is the most robust design option in this scenario, ensuring maximum security and operational integrity.